Regulation and the Liability Problem for Increasingly Autonomous Systems

Peter M. Asaro, PhD

asarop@newschool.edu

Assistant Professor

School of Media Studies, The New School

Affiliate Scholar

Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School

Co-Founder & Vice-Chair

International Committee for Robot Arms Control











Overview

Regulating Robots & Al

- Promote Safety & Innovation
 - Markets
 - Public Opinion

- Expectations & Predictability
- Managing Failures

The Liability Problem

 As increasingly autonomous systems act in the world, in increasingly complex and unpredictable ways, how do we manage the liability for the harms they may cause?

- Separation of:
 - Causal Agency
 - Legal Agency
 - Moral Agency



Liability & Accountability

- Compensation for Harms
- Punishment
 - Retributive Justice
 - Feedback Signal (Reform/Learning)
 - Deterrence (Impact on Future Decisions)
- Intention & Human-Centric
- Accountability & Transparency

Legal Approaches

- Agents & Diminished Agents
 - Children, Slaves, Animals
 - Agency Law
 - Employees
- Product Liability & Negligence (Corporations)
 - Joint & Several Liability
 - Strict Liability
 - Insurance or State/Society

Responsibility

- Retroactive
 - Someone to Blame & Punish
 - Target of Reform (Feedback)
 - Source of Retribution

- Proactive
 - Active Taking of Responsibility
 - Making Moral & Legal Judgements

Human Responsibility

- Meaningful Human Control
- Kill Switch
 - Recognizing Misaligned Values
- Policy Lever
 - Laws Act on Humans/Institutions
- Inappropriate Delegation
 - Lethal Decisions
 - Deprivation of Rights (Due Process)

Accountability Gap in AWS

- Who is responsible for the deaths?
 - Programmers
 - Commanders
 - Operators
 - The AWS
 - The State
 - Nobody? (de facto)
- Minimal Liability in War
- War Crimes Require Intent



Policing & Lethal Robots

- Higher Standards for Use of Force
 - "In order to prevent an immanent threat of
 - death or grave bodily harm."
- Threat ID Requires:
 - Physical Modeling Capability
 - Psychological Model of Intent
 - ent MOTIVATION YOU HAVE 20 SECONDS TO COME
 Lethal Force
- Could Disrupt Threat w/o Lethal Force
- Most Cases are Self-Defense of Officer
- Answer: No Autonomous Use of Force

Future Work

- Regulatory Mechanisms
 - On Humans/Manufacturers
 - Law
 - Ethics Boards
 - Training Engineers
 - Ethics in Design Process (IEEE P7000 Standard)
 - Internal to Autonomous Systems
 - Technical Safety Mechanisms
 - Al/Machine Ethics
 - Learned vs. Imposed by Design

Papers[®]

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Thank You!

Email: asarop@newschool.edu

Twitter: @peterasaro

WWW: www.peterasaro.org